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The Western Balkans: 
deadlock in the EU enlargement process
Marta Szpala
On 9 November the European Commission presented the annual reports 
assessing the progress of the Balkans states in their preparations for EU 
membership, the enlargement strategy up to autumn 2011, and the asses-
sment of the EU membership applications submitted by Albania and Ma-
cedonia. All these documents show that the reform process in the Balkan 
states has slowed down in comparison to previous years. The main reason 
for this slowdown is the negative consequences of the global economic 
crisis for these countries. Nonetheless, the transformation process is con-
tinuing, despite these difficulties.
Another increasingly serious challenge for integrating the Balkan states is 
the EU's growing reluctance to enlarge any further. Among other measures, 
the EU states have blocked the formal acknowledgement of the integration 
progress (objections have been raised to the submission of membership 
applications by Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and to granting Albania 
candidate status), which has significantly prolonged the accession process. 
In fact, this illustrates the lack of political will to accept new members.
The European Commission is aware that the integration process may 
be blocked, and so in the coming year it is planning to focus on fostering 
the idea of enlargement among the EU member states. It will also focus 
on persuading the Balkan states to move on with reforms, especially those 
designed to strengthen state institutions (administration, the judiciary), even 
if their progress will not be formally considered during the integration process. 
The Commission assumes that by the end of next year, the reforms imple-
mented by the Balkan states will be comprehensive enough to persuade the 
EU states to step up the integration process in subsequent years. However, 
if the EU member states' standpoint on the enlargement process does not 
change, the Commission's efforts will not bring about the expected results.
Considering that their prospects for EU membership are receding, the Balkan 
states may not have sufficient motivation to go on with long-term reform ef-
forts. As a result, the transformation process may become impeded, and in the 
longer perspective, the situation in the entire region may be destabilised.
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1	 In	March	2009,	German	chan-
cellor	Angela	Merkel	declared	
that	once	Croatia	is	admitted	
as	a	member,	the	EU	must	
consolidate	before	further	enlar-
gement	takes	place.	
‘EU	must	'consolidate'	before	fur-
ther	enlargement,	Merkel	says’,	
17	March	2009	http://euob-
server.com.	A	similar	demand	
was	voiced	in	the	2009	election	
programme	of	the	CDU/CSU,	
the	current	ruling	party	in	Germany:	
after	the	EU	has	absorbed	12	
new	members,	and	after	Croatia	
joins	the	EU,	a	consolidation	
phase	should	follow	in	order	to	
strengthen	the	EU's	identity	and	
institutions.	Further	enlargement	
must	equally	depend	on	whether	
the	EU	is	able	to	absorb	new	
members	and	whether	they	meet	
the	Copenhagen	criteria.
2	 Geert	Wilders,	the	leader	of	the	
Dutch	Party	for	Freedom,	has	
stated:	“The	Dutch	think	that	
Europe	is	already	large	enough.	
They	oppose	further	enlarge-
ment	and	I	share	this	view.	
We	should	have	a	smaller	Euro-
pe	with	a	fewer	number	of	tasks,	
and	not	a	larger	one,	even	if	it	
should	become	less	influential”.	
“Geert	Wilders:	I’m	in	favour	
of	Romania	and	Bulgaria	leaving	
the	EU”,	6	July	2009,	
http://www.euronews.net
3	 After	Montenegro,	Macedonia	
and	Serbia	lifted	their	visa	
regime	with	the	Schengen	zone,	
the	media	(especially	in	Belgium)	
started	publishing	articles	about	
a	massive	immigration	by	these	
countries'	citizens	submitting	
asylum	applications.	In	Febru-
ary	2010,	when	this	media	
campaign	started,	the	number	
of	applications	had	indeed	
doubled,	but	its	extent	was	still	
insignificant	(287	applications	
from	Serbian	citizens	and	349	
from	Macedonian	citizens).	
4	 Currently	48%	of	the	EU	citizens	
are	opposed	to	further	enlarge-
ment,	especially	in	Austria	(71%),	
Germany	(71%),	France	(66%),	
Finland	(64%),	Belgium	(59%)	
and	the	Netherlands	(57%).	
Eurobarometer	73,	spring	2010.
5	 Croatia	submitted	its	acces-
sion	application	in	February	
2003	and	it	was	passed	to	the	
European	Commission	in	April.	
In	comparison,	the	Serbian	ap-
plication	submitted	in	December	
2009	was	examined	by	the	
Council	as	late	as	October	2010.	
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The EU: consolidation instead of enlargement
The	EU's	internal	problems	(the	economic	crisis,	implementing	the	Lisbon	Treaty),	as	well	as	
its	reluctance	to	enlarge	deriving	from	both	the	political	elites	and	the	public,	have	resulted	in	
making	the	enlargement	policy	even	less	significant.	Some	Western	European	leaders	believe	
that	after	the	adoption	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	the	EU	should	concentrate	on	consolidation	and	
solving	internal	disputes	concerning	the	future	of	the	EU	project1.	They	have	called	for	the	
postponement,	or	even	the	indefinite	suspension,	of	the	enlargement	process2	once	Croatia	
joins	the	EU,	which	in	all	likelihood	will	happen	by	2013.	At	the	same	time,	the	economic	
crisis	has	revealed	how	some	EU	states	(for	example	Greece)	have	failed	to	adjust	sufficiently	
to	the	principles	of	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union,	which	has	seriously	shaken	stability	of	
the	Eurozone.	It	has	also	undermined	the	credibility	of	some	the	EU	states	which	had	been	be-
nefiting	from	membership	without	complying	with	its	common	principles.	This	has	increased	
the	 level	 of	 mistrust	 within	 the	 EU,	 and	
also	 with	 regard	 to	 potential	 candidates.	
Economic	difficulties	 in	 the	EU	have	also	
led	some	Western	European	political	elites	
to	 highlight	 the	 problems	 of	 newly-joined	
or	aspiring	members,	and	treat	these	pro-
blems	as	'red	herrings'	in	the	public	debate.	
These	issues	include	the	influx	of	Roma	pe-
ople	to	France	from	Bulgaria	and	Romania,	
and	a	wave	of	refugees	coming	to	Belgium	
from	Serbia	and	Macedonia3.	Both	campaigns	were	meant	to	divert	the	public’s	attention	from	
the	ruling	coalitions'	problems	and	from	the	necessity	to	implement	tough	reforms.	Economic	
problems	have	produced	social	tension,	and	the	idea	of	solidarity	has	increasingly	come	into	
question.	This	occurred	especially	 in	the	 'old	Europe',	whose	societies	were	faced	with	the	
costs	of	assistance	to	the	member	states	plunged	in	crisis	(as	in	the	Greek	case),	and	are	
unwilling	to	bear	further	financial	burdens	that	would	be	generated	by	the	poorer	countries'	
transformation	and	accession.	
These	aforementioned	processes	have	adversely	affected	the	EU's	enlargement	policy.	Firstly,	
the	difficulties	with	disciplining	those	member	states	which	have	failed	to	implement	the	EU's	
recommendations	have	lead	to	a	further	tightening	of	the	requirements	for	states	aspiring	to	
EU	membership,	even	though	these	requirements	had	already	been	made	much	stricter	com-
pared	to	previous	enlargements.	Secondly,	the	'enlargement	fatigue',	which	has	been	observed	
in	the	last	few	years	and	which	is	primarily	caused	by	a	negative	social	response	in	the	West	
to	the	consequences	of	Romania	and	Bulgaria	joining	the	EU	in	2007,	has	evolved	into	an	
unwillingness	to	sustain	the	idea	of	an	'open	European	Union'4.	Such	moods	are	increasingly	
being	fuelled	by	EU	politicians	who	highlight	the	negative	consequences	of	the	enlargement	
process,	and	thus	win	political	points	on	their	domestic	stages.
Stricter	requirements	and	the	lack	of	political	will	on	the	part	of	the	EU	states	have	caused	
the	enlargement	process	to	be	prolonged.	Procedures	that	were	formal	and	technical	in	na-
ture,	such	as	submitting	the	accession	application	from	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	
to	 the	European	Commission5	or	granting	candidate	status	after	European	Commission's	
positive	assessment6,	are	now	being	blocked,	and	have	become	politicised	on	the	member	
states’	 domestic	 arenas.	 Similar	 tendencies	 can	 be	 perceived	 in	 other	 processes	 aimed	
at	 integrating	 the	Balkan	states	with	 the	EU	zone,	such	as	 the	 liberalisation	of	 the	visa	
regime	and	the	implementation	of	the	Stabilisation	and	Association	Agreements	(SAA)	and	
interim	trade	agreements7.	Moreover,	when	the	Balkan	states	meet	all	the	criteria	needed	
The EU's internal problems 
(the economic crisis, implementing 
the Lisbon Treaty), as well as its reluc-
tance to enlarge deriving from both 
the political elites and the public, 
have resulted in making the enlargement 
policy even less significant.
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6	 In	the	case	of	Croatia,	the	who-
le	procedure	took	two	months.	
Albania	and	Montenegro,	despi-
te	positive	assessments	of	their	
applications	by	the	European	
Commission,	should	not	expect	
to	be	granted	candidate	status	
this	year.	The	Commission	has	
even	refrained	from	issuing	
a	positive	recommendation	
to	Albania.	
7	 Serbia	signed	the	Stabilisation	
and	Association	Agreement	
(SAA)	and	the	interim	agreement	
in	April	2009.	Due	to	objections	
from	the	Netherlands	and	
Belgium,	the	interim	agreement	
came	into	force	in	December	
2009,	and	the	process	
of	ratification	of	SAA	by	
the	member	states	started	
as	late	as	June	2010.
8	 In	2008	the	EU	presented	the	
Balkan	states	with	conditions	
whose	implementation	was	
intended	to	guarantee	them	
the	abolition	of	the	visa	regime	
with	the	Schengen	zone.		
However,	in	October	2010,	
when	the	aforementioned	Bal-
kan	states	complied	with	these	
requirements,	the	French	and	
Belgian	governments	questioned	
the	validity	of	the	decision	to	lift	
the	visa	regime.	Eventually,	
the	visa	regime	was	lifted,	
but	additional	control	mechani-
sms	were	introduced	for	all	
the	Balkan	states	included	
in	the	liberalisation	initiative.	
to	finalise	their	respective	stages	of	 integration,	the	EU	states	try	to	introduce	additional	
control	mechanisms	or	further	conditions.	This	can	be	seen	in	how	a	visa-free	regime	was	
introduced	 for	citizens	of	Albania	and	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina8	or	 the	process	of	granting	
EU	candidate	status	to	Albania.	Such	actions	enhance	the	impression	of	arbitrariness,	and	
the	conviction	that	different	standards	are	being	applied	with	regard	to	individual	states,	
and	that	there	are	no	clear	principles	in	the	process	of	enlargement.	They	also	give	rise	to	
the	suspicion	that	even	if	the	Balkan	states	join	the	EU,	they	will	still	be	treated	as	second-	
-class	members,	as	they	will	be	subject	to	numerous	exceptions	and	control	mechanisms.
The European Commission seeks to overcome 'enlargement fatigue'
The	Commission	has	given	up	its	plans	to	step	up	the	enlargement	process	in	2011,	since	the	
member	states	are	unwilling	to	enlarge	the	Union.	Moreover,	the	Commission	is	aware	that	it	
has	limited	influence	on	states	that	may	block	this	process	for	individual	reasons	(an	example	
of	this	being	the	Greek	stance	on	Macedonia).	The	EU	institutions'	main	objectives	in	the	co-
ming	year	will	be	to	enhance	the	image	of	the	enlargement	policy	among	the	member	states	
and	to	step	up	reforms	in	the	Balkans,	even	if	their	progress	in	the	enlargement	process	is	not	
formally	noted	(for	example,	without	starting	negotiations	or	granting	candidate	status).
For	this	reason,	in	its	strategy	for	the	co-
ming	year	the	European	Commission	has	
for	 the	 first	 time	highlighted	 the	benefits	
that	 the	 Balkan	 states'	 accession	 may	
bring	to	the	individual	member	states	and	
the	EU	as	a	whole.	The	Commission	ar-
gues	that	 in	 the	process	of	enlargement,	
these	countries	will	undergo	a	fundamen-
tal	 transformation	 and	 will	 cease	 to	 be	
a	 source	 of	 threats,	 and	 that	 the	 acces-
sion	 of	 the	Western	Balkans	will	 put	 an	
end	 to	 the	 zone	 of	 instability	 stretching	
along	the	EU	border.	This	will	bring	about	a	general	improvement	in	the	region's	security	
(the	reduction	of	organised	crime	and	immigration,	the	tightening	of	the	EU’s	external	borders).	
The	enlargement	will	also	positively	affect	the	EU’s	economy	by	increasing	the	area	of	the	
common	market.	According	to	the	European	Commission,	an	effective	enlargement	policy	
can	also	strengthen	the	EU's	position	as	a	political	player,	and	reinforce	the	attractiveness	
of	the	European	model	of	integration.
The	European	Commission	has	also	announced	the	 implementation	of	a	communication	
strategy	which	is	meant	to	explicate	the	changes	and	conditions	which	have	been	introdu-
ced	to	the	enlargement	process	currently	being	implemented.	This	process	is	now	based	
on	much	stricter	criteria	compared	to	the	2004	and	2007	enlargements;	benchmarks	for	
opening	negotiation	chapters	have	been	introduced,	among	other	measures.	According	to	
the	Commission,	this	has	eliminated	the	risk	of	admitting	states	that	would	be	insufficiently	
prepared	for	membership.	The	European	Commission	expects	the	member	states’	govern-
ments	to	engage	in	a	positive	information	campaign	for	EU	enlargement.	The	Commission	
has	also	appealed	to	EU	member	states	to	stop	exploiting	the	problems	of	aspiring	states	in	
their	short-term	domestic	political	manoeuvres.	Without	the	support	of	the	member	states,	
the	initiatives	put	forward	by	the	Commission	will	not	translate	into	a	rise	in	popularity	of	
the	idea	of	an	open	Europe.
The EU institutions' main objectives 
in the coming year will be to enhance 
the image of the enlargement policy 
among the member states and to step 
up reforms in the Balkans, even if their 
progress in the enlargement process  
is not formally noted (for example, 
without starting negotiations 
or granting candidate status).
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9	 See	e.g.	H.	Grabbe,	G.	Knaus,	
D.	Korski,	Beyond wait-and-see: 
The way forward for EU Balkan 
Policy,	http://ecfr.eu/page/-/do-
cuments/balkan-policy-brief.pdf
10	 	Macedonia	received	candidate	
status	in	2005.	Ever	since,	due	
to	Greek	objections,	it	has	not	
been	able	to	launch	acces-
sion	negotiations.	The	2009	
report	was	very	favourable	to	
Macedonia,	and	the	European	
Commission	recommended	that	
negotiations	be	opened.	In	this	
year's	report,	the	Commission	
highlighted	a	decline	in	several	
areas	and	serious	impediments	
to	the	pace	of	reform.
The Balkan states: the transformation process risks stagnation
The	economic	crisis,	which	has	deeply	affected	the	Balkan	states,	has	also	influenced	the	
pace	of	reforms	in	the	region.	Falls	in	foreign	investments	and	economic	slowdown	have	re-
vealed	the	shortcomings	of	the	regions'	economies	(Serbia	and	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina	have	
been	forced	to	apply	for	IMF	loans).	The	governments	focused	on	combating	the	negative	
consequences	of	the	crisis,	and	so	they	paid	less	attention	to	introducing	systemic	reforms	
connected	with	the	EU	accession	process.	The	economic	crisis	has	also	brought	a	decline	
in	living	standards,	which	in	turn	translated	into	public	unwillingness	to	implement	reforms.	
Despite	 this,	 most	 of	 the	 region's	 governments	 have	 declared	 that	 their	 transformation	
efforts	will	be	continued	in	the	coming	year,	and	seem	determined	to	implement	the	EU	
recommendations.	These	declarations	have	been	supported	by	tough	reforms	implemented	
within	the	visa	liberalisation	process,	positive	assessments	of	Albania's	and	Montenegro's	
accession	applications,	a	significant	 improvement	 in	 regional	cooperation	 (especially	be-
tween	Serbia	and	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina,	and	between	Serbia	and	Croatia),	and	successful	
fights	against	corruption	(Croatia)	and	organised	crime	(Serbia).
Weak	state	institutions	remain	the	Balkan	states'	main	problem.	These	institutions	lack	the	
administrative	potential	 that	 is	 required	 for	a	prompt	preparation	and	 implementation	of	
the	reforms	stipulated	by	the	EU.	Another	problem	is	the	poor	effectiveness	of	the	judicia-
ry,	which	affects	its	efficacy	at	fighting	organised	crime	and	corruption.	Political	disagre-
ements	create	additional	problems,	both	internal	conflicts	(Albania,	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina)	
and	 disputes	 between	 individual	 states	
(Greece/Macedonia,	 Croatia/Slovenia,	
Kosovo/Serbia),	 as	 they	 slow	 down	 the	
implementation	of	reforms	and	even	direc-
tly	impede	the	enlargement	process.
Considering	the	extent	of	challenges	that	
the	Balkan	 states	 face,	 it	 can	 hardly	 be	
expected	 that	 they	 will	 make	 quick	 and	
significant	 progress	 in	 those	 areas	 whe-
re	 the	EU	has	highlighted	their	negligen-
ce.	Dealing	with	these	problems	requires	
long-term,	consistent	efforts	at	reform.
Experience	from	the	liberalisation	of	the	visa	
regime	has	shown	that	in	order	to	successfully	increase	the	administrative	potential,	there	must	
be	clear,	detailed	and	specific	tasks	which	are	technical	in	nature	and	can	therefore	be	comple-
ted	in	the	short	term	and	are	easy	to	assess.
These	aforementioned	tasks	are	likely	to	force	the	Balkan	states	to	construct	new	effective	in-
stitutions.	This	could	be	achieved	by	beginning	a	screening	process,	followed	by	negotiations	
with	the	individual	Balkan	states.	A	review	of	the	candidate	states'	legislation	would	help	in	
establishing	the	precise	requirements	in	specific	areas;	would	make	the	Balkan	governments	
aware	of	 the	extent	of	 the	necessary	changes;	and	at	 the	same	time	would	help	 them	to	
prepare	plans	for	the	further	implementation	of	reforms.	The	start	of	negotiations	as	such,	to-
gether	with	technical	conditions	for	opening	respective	chapters,	would	force	these	countries	
to	implement	the	EU	criteria	effectively9.	The	EU	adopted	this	strategy	with	regard	to	Turkey,	
and	it	has	proved	to	be	successful.	On	the	other	hand,	the	case	of	Macedonia	proves	that	
a	long-term	obstruction	of	negotiations	is	not	conducive	to	the	strengthening	of	institutions;	
on	the	contrary,	it	impedes	reforms	and	in	some	areas	it	even	causes	regression10.	It	can	also	
be	assumed	that	the	negotiations	with	the	Balkan	states	will	be	long	enough	to	allow	them	to	
strengthen	their	administrative	institutions	and	make	them	more	effective.
The governments of the Balkan 
states may face increasing difficulties 
convincing their respective public 
opinions that further transformation 
efforts need to be made on their route 
to the EU, if the EU itself fails to give 
them more incentives. The perspec-
tive of membership itself, which is 
growing more distant if not less likely, 
will be too weak an incentive.
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The	governments	of	the	Balkan	states	may	face	increasing	difficulties	convincing	their	respec-
tive	public	opinions	that	further	transformation	efforts	need	to	be	made	on	their	route	to	the	
EU,	if	the	EU	itself	fails	to	give	them	more	incentives.	The	perspective	of	membership	itself,	
which	is	growing	more	distant	if	not	less	likely,	will	be	too	weak	an	incentive.	It	cannot	be	
ruled	out	that	the	slowdown	of	the	integration	process	will	boost	the	popularity	of	nationalist	
parties,	and	generate	ethnic	tensions	which	will	pose	threats	to	stability	in	the	region.
Prospects
Within	the	coming	year,	the	EU	is	likely	to	be	preoccupied	mainly	with	its	own	internal	pro-
blems,	and	the	tendency	to	slow	down	the	enlargement	process	may	be	reinforced.	Two	other	
reasons	for	this	slowdown	may	be	a	relatively	stable	situation	in	the	Balkans,	which	would	not	
force	the	EU	to	make	active	efforts	in	the	region,	and	the	EU's	conviction	that	the	Balkan	states	
have	no	alternative	but	to	further	integrate	with	Europe.	This	allows	the	EU	states	to	set	the	
Balkans	increasingly	strict	requirements,	while	at	the	same	time	putting	off	and	even	questio-
ning	the	prospects	of	their	membership.	However,	this	makes	the	EU	itself	look	less	credible,	
and	undermines	the	principles	of	the	enlargement	policy,	which	is	currently	EU's	most	effective	
instrument	for	influencing	the	region	beyond	it.
By	initiating	the	enlargement	policy	with	re-
gard	to	the	Balkan	states,	the	EU	was	not	
only	seeking	their	transformation	and	mem-
bership,	 but	 first	 of	 all	 the	 stabilisation	 of	
the	entire	region.	In	the	longer	perspective,	
the	member	states'	lack	of	political	will	to	con-
tinue	 the	 enlargement	 process	 may	 elevate	
nationalist	groups	to	power	which	could	pose	
a	threat	to	the	fragile	order	in	this	region.
For	 the	Western	Balkan	states	 (except	 for	
Croatia),	the	processes	taking	place	in	the	
EU	mean	 that	 they	must	 be	 prepared	 for	
a	significant	prolongation	of	 the	accession	
process.	Apart	from	Croatia,	it	is	only	Serbia	
that	has	any	chance	of	joining	the	EU	before	
2020.	Progress	 in	 integration	will	 depend	
on	how	consistently	the	individual	states'	governments	implement	reforms.	Their	governments	
will	also	have	to	convince	the	public	that	the	lack	of	formal	progress	does	not	mean	the	suspen-
sion	of	the	enlargement	process,	and	that	prospects	of	membership	are	still	valid.
The	impediments	to	the	enlargement	process	will	also	be	a	challenge	to	Hungary	and	Poland,	who	
will	hold	the	presidency	in	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	in	2011,	especially	after	the	Belgian	
presidency,	which	was	not	active	in	the	Balkan	region.	Both	Hungary	and	Poland	have	for	years	
opted	for	keeping	the	EU	open	and	stepping	up	the	enlargement	process.	Their	task	will	thus	be	
to	support	the	European	Commission	in	its	efforts	to	create	a	positive	image	of	the	enlargement	
policy	among	the	member	states.	In	concrete	terms,	the	presidency	that	supports	the	Commission	
in	its	active	enlargement	policy	will	be	expected	to	engage	in	the	completion	of	accession	nego-
tiations	with	Croatia,	granting	candidate	status	to	Albania	and	Montenegro,	positively	assessing	
Serbia’s	accession	application,	and	including	Kosovo	in	the	visa	liberalisation	initiative
Within the coming year, the EU is 
likely to be preoccupied mainly 
with its own internal problems, 
and the tendency to slow down the en- 
largement process may be reinforced. 
Two other reasons for this slowdown 
may be a relatively stable situation 
in the Balkans, which would not force 
the EU to make active efforts in the 
region, and the EU's conviction that 
the Balkan states have no alternative 
but to further integrate with Europe. 
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I. The progress made by the Balkan states and their prospects for integration with the EU*
The	main	problems	of	all	the	Balkan	states	are:	weak	administrative	institutions	which	are	incapable	of	meeting	the	
accession	process	requirements,	an	ineffective	judiciary	(protracted	trials,	lack	of	judicial	independence),	organised	
crime	and	corruption.	Even	though	some	countries	(Croatia,	Serbia)	have	made	significant	progress	in	these	areas,	
they	are	still	failing	to	meet	the	requirements	set	by	the	EU.	As	a	result	of	the	economic	crisis,	the	situation	in	the	Bal-
kan	economies	has	also	deteriorated.	The	main	political	challenges	in	the	region	include	the	resolution	of	the	Greek/	
Macedonian	conflict,	a	permanent	systemic	crisis	in	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina,	and	the	necessity	to	solve	numerous	pro-
blems	related	to	the	independence	of	Kosovo.	
Croatia: the best in the region
In	2011	Croatia	will	be	the	only	state	which	can	count	on	some	progress	in	the	integration	process	and	the	completion	of	
the	accession	negotiations.	However,	even	though	Croatia	is	the	most	advanced	state	in	the	region,	the	pace	of	the	integra-
tion	process	has	been	much	slower	than	expected,	and	the	finalisation	of	the	negotiations	is	being	continually	postponed.
The	European	Commission	has	positively	assessed	the	Croatian	government's	efforts	to	adapt	the	country	to	EU	require-
ments,	especially	in	its	fight	against	corruption	and	organised	crime.	The	Commission	has	praised	Zagreb	for	its	progress	
in	negotiations,	which	are	now	entering	the	final	phase	(24	of	the	33	negotiation	chapters	have	been	provisionally	conc-
luded).	To	complete	the	negotiations,	Croatia	has	to	finalise	the	restructuring	of	its	shipbuilding	industry,	demonstrate	
its	readiness	to	cooperate	with	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	former	Yugoslavia	(ICTY),	and	show	progress	
in	fighting	corruption	(especially	high-level	corruption).	However,	the	European	Commission	believes	that	if	Croatia	com-
plies	with	the	requirements	concerning	the	closure	of	the	'Judiciary	and	fundamental	rights'	negotiation	chapter,	it	will	not	
be	necessary	to	establish	a	controlling	mechanism	to	monitor	judiciary	reforms	and	fight	against	corruption	and	organised	
crime	after	Croatia's	accession	to	the	EU	(such	mechanisms	were	established	for	Romania	and	Bulgaria).
Montenegro and Albania: approaching EU membership
The	European	Commission	has	expressed	a	positive	assessment	of	both	countries'	accession	applications,	which	
completes	another	stage	of	their	integration	with	the	EU	and	opens	the	way	for	them	to	gain	official	candidate	status.	
This	is	subject	to	a	unanimous	decision	by	the	Council	of	the	European	Union,	which	is	made	at	the	initiative	of	the	
state	holding	the	presidency.	The	negotiations	with	the	two	states	will	be	launched	once	they	meet	the	EU	conditions	
(the	Copenhagen	criteria).	This	can	be	expected	no	sooner	than	2012.
Montenegro	must	make	significant	progress	in	the	effectiveness	of	its	state	institutions,	especially	in	the	area	of	the	rule	
of	law.	However,	considering	the	advanced	stage	of	reforms	in	this	country,	the	Commission	has	recommended	that	the	
Council	grant	Montenegro	candidate	status.	In	the	case	of	Albania,	the	general	operation	of	democratic	mechanisms	must	
be	improved.	The	conflict	between	the	main	political	parties,	which	has	been	ongoing	since	June	2009,	is	undermining	the	
stability	of	the	democratic	institutions	(including	the	parliament)	and	has	already	contributed	to	the	slowdown	of	the	pace	
of	reform.	This	was	why	the	Commission	did	not	recommend	that	the	Council	granted	Albania	candidate	status.
Macedonia and Serbia: continuing the reforms 
The	process	of	the	two	states'	integration	with	the	EU	has	been	blocked	by	several	EU	members.	In	the	case	of	Mace-
donia,	it	is	the	conflict	with	Greece	over	the	name	of	the	state.	Serbia's	integration	is	opposed	by	the	Netherlands	and	
Belgium,	among	other	states,	due	to	this	country's	unsatisfactory	cooperation	with	the	ICTY.
Macedonia	received	EU	candidate	status	in	2005,	but	it	was	only	in	2009	that	the	European	Commission	recommended	
that	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	launch	negotiations	with	this	country.	The	Commission	maintained	this	recom-
mendation	in	this	year's	report,	even	though	its	assessment	of	Macedonia's	preparation	for	accession	is	less	favourable.	
A	positive	assessment	was	made	of	the	reforms	to	parliamentary	regulations	and	public	administration,	and	of	the	stability	
and	effectiveness	of	the	executive	branch	of	government.	Criticism	was	made	of	the	deteriorating	investment	climate,	mostly	
because	the	adopted	regulations	were	not	implemented	and	corruption	did	not	decrease.	The	Commission	also	recommen-
ded	completing	the	implementation	of	the	Prud	Agreement	(concerning	the	status	of	the	Albanian	minority)	and	the	impro-
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vement	of	political	dialogue.	Since	the	launch	of	the	accession	negotiations	with	Macedonia	requires	a	unanimous	decision	
by	the	Council	of	the	European	Union,	it	is	therefore	dependent	on	the	resolution	of	Macedonia's	conflict	with	Greece.
Serbia	is	carrying	on	with	its	reforms,	albeit	more	slowly	than	last	year.	A	positive	assessment	was	made	of	the	growing	
effectiveness	of	the	Serbian	police	and	the	accelerating	fight	against	organised	crime.	The	Commission	has	appreciated	
Belgrade's	initiatives	for	the	reconciliation	in	the	region,	which	has	led	to	a	significant	improvement	of	Serbia's	relations	
with	Croatia	and	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina.	The	Commission	nonetheless	expects	a	'pragmatic	approach'	to	be	taken	towards	
Kosovo.	To	make	progress	in	the	negotiations,	Serbia	has	to	continue	its	cooperation	with	the	ICTY,	which	also	includes	the	
arrests	of	the	war	criminals	Goran	Hadžić	and	Ratko	Mladić.	In	2011	the	European	Commission	will	assess	Serbia's	acces-
sion	application	which	was	submitted	in	December	2008;	this	assessment	is	expected	to	be	ready	by	autumn	2011.
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo: lagging behind
In	comparison	to	the	remaining	Balkan	states,	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina	and	Kosovo	are	definitely	less	advanced	in	the	
process	of	integration	with	the	EU,	and	have	no	chances	of	achieving	significant	progress	in	2011.
In	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina,	the	transformation	is	impeded	by	the	conflict	in	the	political	elite.	There	is	no	consent	among	
the	leaders	as	to	what	the	reforms	and	the	systemic	transformation	should	look	like.	As	a	result,	no	progress	has	
been	noted	in	strengthening	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law,	or	the	functionality	and	efficiency	of	state	administration	
and	the	government.	The	authorities	are	failing	to	implement	important	economic	reforms,	which	in	turn	deepens	the	
budget’s	instability,	impedes	privatisation	and	worsens	the	business	environment.
Since	the	proclamation	of	its	independence	in	2008,	Kosovo	has	been	gradually	strengthening	its	state	institutions	and	
implementing	economic	reforms.	However,	the	process	of	obtaining	EU	membership	has	been	seriously	delayed.	Kosovo	
is	the	only	state	to	not	have	signed	the	Stabilisation	and	Association	Agreement	(SAA)	with	the	EU;	neither	is	it	included	
in	the	process	of	visa	regime	liberalisation.	The	reason	for	this	delay,	in	contrast	to	other	states	in	the	region,	is	that	the	
process	of	institution-building	in	Kosovo	is	in	its	initial	phase,	and	also	because	five	EU	member	states	have	not	recognised	
Kosovo's	independence.	This	hampers	the	development	of	a	unanimous	EU	policy	towards	this	state.	In	the	coming	year,	
the	European	Commission	will	make	efforts	to	include	Kosovo	in	the	visa	liberalisation	process.
*	Based	on	Enlargement Strategy and Progress Reports 2010,	http://ec.europa.eu
II. Economic indicators in 2009
Population, 
in millions 
GDP growth 
Budget deficit 
(% of GDP)
FDI decrease 
in 2009 
Unemploy-
ment
GDP 
per capita 
in US$
Albania 3.2 +3.3% 6.9% no	data 13.5% 3837**
Bosnia &  
Herzegovina
3.8 -3.2% 5.0% 43.0%* 41.5%* 4365**
Croatia 4.5 -5.8% 3.9% 69.0%* 9.4%* 15284**
Montenegro 0.6 -5.3% 3.5% no	data 20.4% 6633**
Kosovo 2.1 +2.9% b.d. 20.5%* 45.4% 2984**
Macedonia 2.1 -0.7% 2.8% 63.8%* 43.3% 4546**
Serbia 7.3 -3.0% 4.1% 29.0%* 16.1%* 5821**
Unless otherwise stated, the data has been provided by the respective countries' statistical offices or central banks.
* Source: Unicredit; ** Source: International Monetary Fund
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